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ABSOLUTE DEFERENCE LEADS TO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE: THE NEED
FOR A NEW PUBLIC USE RULE
Michael J. Coughlin'
Interpretations of the Public Use Clause' by the U.S. Supreme Court
2
and state supreme courts3 have forced countless Americans to forfeit
their real property to powerful private developers so those developers
can put the property to a more profitable use.4 Imagine owning a piece
of property as an investment and then learning that a city-sponsored
redevelopment project will help attract new development around the
property. Because of the increase in property value that results from
redevelopment projects,5 this appears to be good news. But if the
property is part of the redevelopment project, the joy will give way to
anger if the legislature uses its "despotic power" of eminent domain 6 and
' J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to thank my parents, Nancy and John Coughlin, for supporting my
academic endeavors, my fiance for her loving encouragement, Professor George P. Smith
II for his insightful input, and all of the law review staff members who spent countless
hours assisting me in the editing process.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
3. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27
(2004); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev.
2003); Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A., in EMINENT
DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 333, 335-36 (Am. Law Inst., Am. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Continuing Prof'l Educ., No. C975 1995) (noting that forty-nine states
have public use clauses in their constitutions, and the one state without, North Carolina,
statutorily requires that takings be for a public use), available at WL C975 ALI-ABA 333.
4. DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER. PRIVATE GAIN 2 (2003) (documenting that in
the forty-one states studied between 1998 and 2002, a total of 10,282 takings were
threatened or filed where the real property involved would be transferred to a private
entity), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/report/pdf/ED-report.pdf. Increasing
property tax revenue is a primary reason why state and local legislatures authorize
transferring real property from one private entity to another private entity through the
exercise of eminent domain. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510 (discussing how the challenged
taking, if allowed, would result in a tax revenue increase from $680,544 to $1,249,843).
5. Catherine Michel, Note, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment
Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 457-58 (1996) (discussing the rationale behind tax
increment financing as a means of publicly funding redevelopment projects, and offering
that "[als the property is redeveloped, its inherent value should rise, and property tax
revenues should increase correspondingly").
6. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). The
Court stated that
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takes the property for the purpose of transferring ownership to another
private entity who plans to use the property for private gain.
The facts just described are those found in the case Kelo v. City of New
London,7 now at the center of the controversy of whether a taking for the
purposes of economic development constitutes a public use, which the
Supreme Court will decide during its 2004-2005 Term. Until the Court's
1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,9 this scenario never would have
passed judicial scrutiny under the Court's Public Use Clause
jurisprudence.'0 But the Court in Berman, for the first time, adopted a
deferential approach to reviewing legislative determinations of public use
by allowing for only a narrow inquiry into the public purpose of a
taking," even though ownership of the condemned property was
transferred to a private party. 2 Such a taking is referred to as a "public-
private" taking. 3 The Court reaffirmed Berman's deferential approach
[tihe despotic power, as it is aptly called by some writers, of taking private
property, when state necessity requires, exists in every government; the existence
of such power is necessary; government could not subsist without it; and if this be
the case, it cannot be lodged any where with so much safety as with the
Legislature. The presumption is, that they will not call it into exercise except in
urgent cases, or cases of the first necessity.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004). For a more detailed
discussion of the facts, see infra text accompanying notes 135-37.
8. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Kelo (No. 04-108) (stating the question
presented as whether or not a public-private taking "for the sole purpose of 'economic
development'" is permissible under the Public Use Clause), available at 2004 WL 1659558.
9. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
10. Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1923) (adopting the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's position "that neither the development of the private commerce of [a]
city nor the incidental profit which might enure to [a] city out of such a procedure could
constitute a public use authorizing condemnation").
11. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
12. Id. at 31 (presenting the undisputed argument by the condemnee that his property
was "commercial, not residential property; it [was] not slum housing; [and that] it [would]
be put into the project under the management of a private, not a public, agency and
redeveloped for private, not public, use").
13. Jeffery W. Scott, Public Use and Private Profit: When Should Heightened Scrutiny
Be Applied to "Public-Private" Takings?, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 466, 466 (2003) (describing a "public-private" taking as "when the government
uses its power of eminent domain to take private property to serve a public purpose but
conveys actual ownership or exclusive use of the property to another private entity"). The
property owner whose property is taken will hereinafter be referred to as the
"condemnee," and the private entity to whom ownership or control of the property is
transferred will hereinafter be referred to as the "transferee."
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to reviewing legislative determinations of public use in the 1984 decision
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.
4
This Comment focuses on the meaning of the term "public use" as it
was conceived originally at the time of the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, and, more particularly, on the public-private takings that are
permissible under the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court established in Midkiff
that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,'" thereby allowing for a
universal declaration of what constitutes a public use and, more
importantly, what constitutes a permissible public-private taking.'
Unless the Supreme Court desires individuals' property rights to
continue to fall prey to the interests of private developers, the Court
must reconsider the deferential approach employed in Berman and
Midkiff and establish a comprehensive rule declaring what constitutes a
public use.
This Comment begins by exploring the original meaning of the Public
Use Clause at the time of its enactment and then discusses the Supreme
Court cases decided prior to Berman that touch upon the
constitutionality of public-private condemnations. Next, this Comment
sets forth the Court's deferential approach in reviewing legislative
determinations. Then, this Comment touches on state court decisions
that followed the deferential approach when reviewing takings for
14. 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (holding that "if a legislature, state or federal,
determines there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must
defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use").
15. Id. at 231-32.
16. Id. Prior to this pronouncement, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
state-initiated condemnations only under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but still required that the taking be for a public use. Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). The Court stated:
[A] legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the property of one
individual and give it to another individual, would not he due process of law as
enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be that the requirement of due
process of law in that amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the
State to public use and without compensation of the private property of the
citizen.
Id.; see also Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930) ("It is well established that in
considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of expropriation of
private party, the question of what is a public use is a judicial one."). Vester centered on
an "excess condemnation" claim by a condemnee, which the Court defined as "the taking
of more land than is needed to be occupied by the improvement directly in
contemplation." Id. at 441. The Court struck down the condemnation as a violation of
state law because the only evidence that was presented to support the taking was "a mere
statement by the council that the excess condemnation [was] in furtherance of [a public]
use." Id. at 447, 449.
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economic development, including Kelo, and takings for blight clearance.
The following Part briefs the Michigan Supreme Court's decision County
of Wayne v. Hathcock, 7 in part because it declares public-private takings
for economic development to be unconstitutional under Michigan law."
Next is an analysis of the Berman and Midkiff decisions' deferential level
of review of public-private condemnations in light of the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause and pre-Berman precedent, followed
by an examination of alternative approaches to evaluating the
constitutionality of takings actions, including the approach adopted in
Hathcock. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that public-private
takings are permissible, but only under two of the categories articulated
in Hathcock: (1) where a "public necessity of the extreme sort '" 9 requires
a public-private taking, and (2) where condemned property in private
hands remains subject to public oversight.
I. PRERATIFICATION THROUGH HA THCOCK: THE HISTORY OF THE
PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
A. Original Meaning of the Public Use Clause
James Madison proposed to the House of Representatives what
became the Takings Clause,2 ° which provides "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."" Madison
17. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
18. Id. at 784.
19. Id. at 783.
20. House of Representatives Debates, May-June, 1789 [hereinafter House Debates],
in 5 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF R[GHTS 1012, 1026-27 (1980).
Madison's original formulation of what became the Takings Clause and Public Use Clause
of the Fifth Amendment was that "[n]o person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his
property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation." Id. at
1027. Madison authored all of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1026-28. Because of Madison's
central role in the ratification of the Public Use Clause, an understanding of his viewpoint
on the proper role of government in relation to individual freedom and property rights is
central to determine the original meaning of the Public Use Clause. See William Michael
Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708-13 (1985).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). This Clause as a whole is referred to as
the Takings Clause, while the language "for public use" is referred to as the Public Use
Clause. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984). Although proposed to
the House of Representatives by Madison, the Takings and Public Use Clauses were not
his invention; The Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of
Rights, 1772, put forth by the Massachusetts colonists, included the following provisions:
"The supreme power cannot Justly take from any man, any part of his property without
his consent, in person or by his Representative." The Rights of the Colonists and a List of
Infringements and Violations of Rights, 1772, in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 200, 203.
Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, states passed their own versions, including
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subscribed to John Locke's social contract theory of government 22 and
like Locke, he viewed the protection of property rights as one of the
central purposes of government, and proposed the Public Use Clause to
help further this purpose.23 Madison hoped that the Fifth Amendment
Massachusetts, which it called its Declaration of Rights and which specifically stated (and
still does today):
But no part of the property of any individual, can, with justice, be taken from
him, or applied to public uses without his own consent, or that of the
representative body of the people . . . . And whenever the public exigencies
require, that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public
uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 339, 341-42
(emphasis added). Virginia and Vermont had similar provisions in their respective
Declaration of Rights. Journal of the Virginia Convention, 1776, in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 20, at 236, 238; Vermont Declaration of Rights, 1777, in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 20,
at 319, 322.
22. See House Debates, supra note 20, at 1026 (including one of Madison's unadopted
amendments to the Constitution which articulated [t]hat Government is instituted and
ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety"). The following passage articulates John Locke's theory
of how property rights are central to the social contract:
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without
his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Government,
and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires,
that the People should have Property, without which they must be suppos'd to
lose that by entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered into
it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own.... Hence it is a mistake to think,
that the Supream or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, can do what it
will, and dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them
at pleasure.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360-61 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690).
Locke's idea that governments were created for the benefit of the people and the
protection of individual rights is referred to as the social contract theory of government.
See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights in the Modern Administrative-
Industrial State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321, 324 (1990) ("The framers of the
Constitution, following the social contract theory of the philosopher John Locke, saw
government as a voluntary compact entered into by individuals to provide security for
their rights." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). Thomas Jefferson also subscribed to
Locke's social contract theory of government. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[T]hat all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
(emphasis added)).
23. See supra note 22. Madison offered the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which states that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," also to further the goal of protecting property
rights. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). He believed fundamentally that '[a]
government 'which [even] indirectly violates [individuals'] property in their actual
possessions... is not a pattern for the United States."' BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY
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would serve an even broader purpose as a "paper barrier" between the
government and private property,24 thereby impressing on all citizens, not
just the Federal Government, the "sanctity of property."25 Additionally,
Madison feared that powerful factions interested in the acquisition of
more property would influence the legislatures for their own benefit 6 at
the expense of the less powerful, and proposed the Public Use Clause in
part to control the effects of the factions' influence.2' He assigned the
responsibility of enforcing the Bill of Rights, and thus the requirement
that takings be for a public use, to the courts.2 For Madison, therefore,
AND FREEDOM 14 (1997) (quoting NAT'L GAZETTE (Pennsylvania) Mar. 29, 1792,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 268-69 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953)).
24. See House Debates, supra note 20, at 1030. Madison stressed that "[p]aper
barriers ... have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the
public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be
one means to control the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise
inclined." Id.
25. Treanor, supra note 20, at 711-12. An underlying purpose behind all of Madison's
proposed amendments was to quash the idea that the Constitution was adopted "in order
to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism." House Debates, supra note 20, at
1024.
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (stating that
"the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal
distribution of property"); see Treanor, supra note 20, at 710 (arguing that "[t]he diversity
of interests that possession of property occasioned prevented tyranny"). Madison warned
that "it is against the enterprising ambition of [the legislature], that the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at
257 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001). He further maintained that the protection
afforded by his Bill of Rights was necessary because "[t]he legislative department is every
where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex." Id. at 256-57.
27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 26, at 43 (stating that one of the two
methods of "curing the mischiefs of faction" is to "control[] its effects"). Madison also
feared absolute majority rule and expressed concern that "[i]n all cases where a majority
are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger."
MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY 107 (1993) (quoting JAMES
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 76 (Bicentennial ed.
1987)).
28. House Debates, supra note 20, at 1031 (setting forth the idea that "[i]f [the Bill of
Rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights"). One of the
earliest Supreme Court cases dealing with property rights declared such rights as
fundamental to the social compact. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304,
310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). Specifically, the Court stated:
From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing
property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their
subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was
one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would become
a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest
labour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the
1006
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takings under the Fifth Amendment could only be for a public use
because a taking for a private use would demonstrate a failure of the
courts to control the influence of factions and a violation of the social
contract by depriving the condemnee of his or her property rights for the
purpose of benefiting another.
B. The Supreme Court's Pre-Berman Treatment of Public-Private
Takings
The earliest Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality of
public-private takings under the Public Use Clause was the 1848 decision
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix.2 9 In Dix the issue centered on the use of
eminent domain and its constitutionality in relation to the Contracts
Clause?3 Despite this narrow question, two justices filed concurring
opinions in which they countered the condemnor's argument that
Vermont could condemn the land of one private entity and transfer it to
another private entity with no change in the use of the property.3 Justice
McLean unequivocally stated, "[t]his the state cannot do. It would in
effect be taking the property from A to convey to B."3 Justice McLean
therefore would support a prohibition of public-private takings where the
transferee uses it for the same purpose as the condemnee-profit.33
Justice Woodbury also filed a concurrence and offered what
social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a
fundamental law.
Id.
29. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). In this case, the taking itself involved a taking by the
state of a private bridge constructed by a state-chartered corporation so that the bridge
could be put to public use. Id. at 531.
30. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 530; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
31. Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring); id. at 543-44 (Woodbury, J., concurring). The
argument advanced by Vermont was that
where a grant of a franchise comes in collision with a previous grant of a similar
kind, it has been objected, that it was not competent for the legislature to take
the property of one person for the use and benefit of another; yet such a
proceeding has been sustained, where it is for public use, and the increased
benefit to the public requires the sacrifice.
Id. at 528-29.
32. Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring). He continued, "The public purpose for which
the power is exerted must be real, not pretended." Id. (McLean, J., concurring).
33. See id. at 537-38 (McLean, J., concurring). The condemnee in this case, the West
River Bridge Co., owned and operated a toll bridge across the West River in Brattleboro,
Vermont. Id. at 510. Keeping with Madison's hope that the Public Use Clause would
impress upon both the states and the Federal Government the "sanctity of property," see
supra text accompanying notes 24-25, Justice McLean proposed that his interpretation of
the clause be applied universally, Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 538 (McLean, J., concurring)
(admitting that "rtlhis refers to the action of the federal government," but further stating
that "a similar provision is contained in all the State constitutions").
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commentators have referred to as the "narrow interpretation" of the
Public Use Clause,34 arguing that any other interpretation would be "too
broad, too open to abuse."3 Neither the concurring opinions of Justice
Woodbury and Justice McLean, nor the majority opinion, stated that in
public-private takings, the proper review for the court is to defer to a
legislative determination of public use.36
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in the 1896 decision United
States v. Gettysburg Electric Railroad Co.,37 which involved a "public-
public" taking,38 suggested that deference to legislative determinations of
public use is inappropriate when evaluating a private-private taking.-
34. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 545 (Woodbury, J., concurring) (stating that "the
doctrine, that this right of eminent domain exists for every kind of public use, or for such a
use when merely convenient, though not necessary, does not seem to me by any means
clearly maintainable"); see Scott, supra note 13, at 468 (summarizing the narrow
interpretation as requiring "that the public must be entitled to some type of direct use of
the particular property that is taken"). Justice Woodbury pointed out that the court
findings of public uses "are confined chiefly to bridges and roads, and the incidents to
war." Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 545 (Woodbury, J., concurring); see George F. Will,
Despotism in New London, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at B7 (adopting the narrow view
by stating that "[t]he framers of the Bill of Rights used language carefully; clearly they
intended the adjective 'public' to restrict government takings to uses that are directly
owned or primarily used by the general public, such as roads, bridges or public buildings");
DAVID. A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 61 (1992)
(synthesizing the Berman and Midkiff decisions as "finally resolv[ing] the broad-versus-
narrow debate on eminent domain").
35. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 545 (Woodbury, J., concurring). Clarifying what are
permissible public uses, Justice Woodbury stated that
the user [sic] must be for the people at large,-for travellers,-for all,-must also
be compulsory by them, and not optional with the owners,-must be a right by
the people, not a favor,-must be under public regulations as to tolls, or owned,
or subject to be owned, by the State, in order to make the corporation and object
public .. "
Id. at 546 (Woodbury, J., concurring). He admitted that property condemned for the
construction of a private road held by a private entity may benefit the public, but argued
that "such a benefit is not technically nor substantially a public use, unless the public has
rights." Id. at 547 (Woodbury, J., concurring). He asked, "Who ever heard of laws to
condemn private property for public use, for a marine hospital or state prison?" Id. at 546
(Woodbury, J., concurring). He admitted that such uses are public, but stated that "[n]o
necessity seems to exist, which is sufficient to justify so strong a measure." Id.
36. See generally W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
37. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
38. Id at 679-80. The U.S. Government, through the Secretary of War, initiated the
taking of privately owned real property in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, following the Civil
War, with the intent of attaining government ownership and control over the land in order
to preserve the Gettysburg battlefield. Id. This is referred to as a "public-public" taking,
because a public body is exercising the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
owning the property itself and making that property available to the public.
39. See id. at 680; see also infra text accompanying note 41. A "private-private"
taking refers to a taking initiated by a corporation who, by statute, is granted the power of
1008
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The Court found that it was appropriate to follow a rule of deference
when reviewing a public-public taking.40 However, the Court also stated:
It is quite a different view of the question which courts will take
when this power is delegated to a private corporation. In that
case the presumption that the intended use for which the
corporation proposes to take the land is public is not so strong
as where the government intends to use the land itself.
41
Prior to Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme Court in Brown v. United
States42 approved a public-private condemnation where the public nature
of the use was not as clear43 as the takings evaluated in Dix4A and
Gettysburg Electric.45 The condemnees in Brown contended "that the
power of eminent domain does not extend to the taking of one man's
property to sell it to another, that such an object can not be regarded as
for a public use of the property., 46 The Court noted that it could find no
Supreme Court precedent that permitted such a public-private taking,47
eminent domain because its business operations are essential to the public, such as
providing rail service. See Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908)
(upholding a condemnation initiated by a private railroad company created by the State of
Virginia).
40. Gettysburg Elec., 160 U.S. at 680 (stating that when a "legislature has declared the
use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the
use be palpably without reasonable foundation"). This deferential rule is juxtaposed with
the Court's belief that "rtlhe responsibility of Congress to the people will generally, if not
always, result in a most conservative exercise of the right." Id.
41. Id.
42. 263 U.S. 78 (1923).
43. Id. at 80-83. The United States desired to construct an irrigation system in an
area of southeast Idaho and, as a part of that project, it needed to construct a reservoir in
the city of American Falls, Idaho. Id. at 80. The condemnees in Brown were landowners
of a 120-acre tract of land that was outside the threatened area of American Falls. Id. The
private individuals who were to receive the condemned land, the transferees, were the
townspeople of American Falls, whose homes were going to be destroyed by flooding
caused by the construction of the reservoir in their town. Id. at 81. Congress chose this
method of compensating the transferees by substitution over condemning their land in
American Falls because "[t]he usual and ordinary method of condemnation of the lots in
the old town.., would be ill adapted to the exigency[,]" considering not only the difficulty
in fixing a value to property that would be flooded, but also the inequity of eliminating
almost an entire town and not assisting the people displaced in finding homes. Id. at 82-
83.
44. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. Brown, 263 U.S. at 81.
47. Id. at 83 (stating that "it would not be surprising if no precedent could be found to
aid us as an authority"). The Court did not find any of its own precedent, but it did
describe an analogous case where the Maryland Court of Appeals allowed a railroad
company to condemn the private land of one individual to serve as a right of way for other
private individuals whose only access to a public highway had been taken by the railroad
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but nonetheless held that the taking was constitutional under the Public
Use Clause. The Court described the circumstances of the case as
"peculiar,"" and narrowed the scope of its holding by asserting that it did
not conflict with a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision that prohibited
a public-private taking undertaken for economic development purposes,
further suggesting that such public-private takings are unconstitutional.5 0
C. The "Foundation" of the Modern Court's Deferential Rule
The deferential approach to congressional public use determinations
seen in Gettysburg Electric reappeared in Old Dominion Land Co. v.
United States.5' In Old Dominion, the Court reviewed a condemnation,
filed by the Secretary of War, of land containing military buildings
owned by the United States in Newport News, Virginia. The Court
declared that "[Congress's] decision is entitled to deference until it is
shown to involve an impossibility"" and held that the military purposes
for the building constituted a public use. However, this deferential
approach was in the context of a public-public condemnation, because it
company. Id. (discussing Pitznogle v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 87 A. 917 (Md.
1913)).
48. Brown, 263 U.S. at 83. The Court justified the holding by stating that "[a] method
of compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of making the parties
whole. The power of condemnation is necessary to such a substitution." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 83-84. The majority stated:
Our conclusion is not in conflict with that class of cases with which the
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt in the Opinion of
Justices, 204 Mass. 607. It was there proposed that the City of Boston, in
building a street through a crowded part of the city, should be given power to
condemn lots abutting on both sides of the proposed street with a view to sale of
them after the improvement was made, for the promotion of the erection of
warehouses, mercantile establishments and other buildings suited to the demands
of trade and commerce. The Justices were of opinion that neither the
development of the private commerce of the city nor the incidental profit which
might enure to the city out of such a procedure could constitute a public use
authorizing condemnation. The distinction between that case and this is that
here we find that the removal of the town is a necessary step in the public
improvement itself and is not sought to be justified only as a way for the United
States to reduce the cost of the improvement by an outside land speculation.
Id. at 83-84.
51. 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
52. Id. at 63. Prior to initiating the condemnation, Congress passed a statute
authorizing the Secretary of War to condemn these sites. Id. at 64.
53. Id. at 66.
54. Id.
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was initiated by the Federal Government so that it could own the real
property underlying the military structures.5 5
The Court in United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Welch, 6 another public use centered-case involving a public-public
taking,57 quoted the deferential language found in Old Dominion.5 ' But
the Court went further and stated that "[ainy departure from this judicial
restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a
governmental function., 59 With these words, the Court departed from
one of its essential jurisprudential principles established when the Court
was in its infancy: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."' The Welch Court also departed
from the principle that the Takings and Public Use Clauses require
courts to determine whether the land taken will be devoted to a public
61use. Moreover, two justices on the Welch Court disagreed over the
scope of the deferential rule established in the majority opinion.
Accordingly, the foundation for a deferential approach toward even a
55. Id. at 64 ("[The purpose of the taking was] '[s]ites for military purposes: For
completion of acquisition of real estate as authorized by' [statute]: 'For quartermaster
warehouses, Newport News, Virginia... ' (quoting Deficiencies Appropriation Act of
July, 1, 1922, ch. 258, 42 Stat. 767, 777)).
56. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
57. Id. at 548-51 (summarizing that the condemnation involved the taking of land
from private individuals by a congressionally created public works company because they
were left without ingress and egress following flooding caused by the construction of a
dam, and the subsequent transfer of that land to the National Park Service).
58. Id. at 552 ("'[Congress's] decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to
involve an impossibility.'" (quoting Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S 55,
66 (1925))).
59. Id. The Court continued by offering that without judicial restraint in the context
of public-public condemnations, courts would be "invalidating legislation on the basis of
their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved
impracticable in other fields." Id.
60. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
61. Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908) (stating that "the nature
of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial question"); see supra text
accompanying note 28.
62. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 547, 556 (Reed, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[t]his taking is for a public purpose but whether it is or is not is a
judicial question"). Justice Reed stated that without such a rule, "the constitutional
doctrine of the Separation of Powers would be unduly restricted if an administrative
agency could invoke a so-called political power so as to immunize its action against iudicial
examination in contests between the agency and the citizen." Id. at 556-57 (Reed, J.,
concurring). He continued by saying "[t]he former cases go no further than this." Id. at
557 (Reed, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter filed a separate concurrence disagreeing
with Justice Reed's interpretation of the Court's opinion. He advanced the position that
when the Court cited Old Dominion it did so to "recognize[] the doctrine that whether a
taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond judicial competence." Id. at 557-58
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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public-public taking remained unstable as late as the 1946 Welch
decision.63
E. Berman and Midkiff Extend the Deferential Rule to Public-Private
Takings
1. Berman
Despite the dicta relating to private-private takings in Gettysburg
Electric,64 the precedent in Brown,65 and the original meaning of the
Public Use Clause, 66 the Supreme Court in Berman deviated from the
approach that public-private takings should not be afforded deferential
treatment. 67 The setting for Berman was Washington, D.C., in the early
1950s, where Congress had determined that the city had fallen into a
general slum state."' Seeking to remedy this problem, Congress enacted
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.69 Congress
determined that "'the acquisition and the assembly of real property and
the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a project area
redevelopment plan ... is hereby declared to be a public use.""'7  In its
implementation of the Act, the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency (Agency) condemned a department store.7  The
63. See supra note 62.
64. See supra text accompanying note 41.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 20 28.
67. 348 U.S. 26,32-33 (1954).
68. Id. at 28 (."[Clonditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to
substandard housing and blighted areas ... are injurious to the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare ....' (quoting the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945,
Pub. L. No. 592, § 2, 60 Stat. 790, 790)). In the redevelopment area, the following
conditions existed: "64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major
repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3%
had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, 83.8%
lacked central heating." Id. at 30.
69. Pub. L. No. 592, 60 Stat. 790 (1945). The Act created a Planning Commission,
which was "directed to make and, from time to time, develop a comprehensive or general
plan of the District of Columbia." Id. § 6(a), 60 Stat. at 794. The Act also spelled out the
procedures for the adoption of redevelopment plans, which were required prior to any
condemnation proceedings under the Act. Id. § 6(b), (d), 60 Stat. at 794-95. The
redevelopment plan was to include "approximate locations and extents of the land uses
proposed for and within the area, such as public buildings ...public and private open
spaces, and other categories of public and private uses." Id. § 6(b)(2), 60 Stat. at 794
(emphasis added).
70. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added) (quoting § 2,60 Stat. at 791).
71. Id. at 28, 31. The Court summarized the role of the District of the Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency (Agency) under the Act as follows:
After the real estate has been assembled, the Agency is authorized to
transfer to public agencies the land to be devoted to such public purposes as
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landowner challenged the condemnation under the Public Use Clause,
and argued that it was unconstitutional because his property was
"commercial, not residential property; it [was] not slum housing; [and
that] it [would] be put into the project under the management of a
private, not a public, agency and redeveloped for private, not public,
use." 
72
Rather than evaluating the condemnee's due process and public use
claims, the Court upheld Congress's legislative scheme as a proper
exercise of its police power.73 The Court demonstrated its deferential
approach to this public-private taking by stating that "[s]ubject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. 74 This leaves
"[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being
exercised for a public purpose [as] an extremely narrow one, 75 so narrow
that "[i]f those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the
Nation's Capital should be beautiful . . . there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
'
,
76
The Court next found that Congress, not the courts, has the authority
to select the means by which it will carry out its police power.77 In this
case, Congress chose "the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of
the area"' as the means. The argument advanced by the condemnee was
that "this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the
benefit of another businessman., 79  Rather than exploring the
streets, utilities, recreational facilities, and schools, § 7(a), and to lease or sell the
remainder as an entirety or in parts to a redevelopment company, individual, or
partnership. § 7(b), (f). The leases or sales must provide that the lessees or
purchasers will carry out the redevelopment plan and that "no use shall be made
of any land or real property included in the lease or sale nor any building or
structure erected thereon" which does not conform to the plan. § 7(g).
Id. at 30.
72. Id. at 31; see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 179 (1985) (discussing how the condition of the
condemnee's land did not change after title passed to the transferee).
73. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32 (likening Congress's power over the District of
Columbia to the legislative powers states may exercise as "what traditionally has been
known as the police power"). The Court admitted the difficulty in defining the police
power by stating that "[a]n attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless,
for each case must turn on its own facts." Id. at 32.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 33. The Court further declared that "[o]nce the object is within the
authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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condemnee's argument in light of well-established precedent,' ° the Court
stubbornly reiterated that "the means of executing the project are for
Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has
been established.,
81
The Berman Court justified its decision to allow the condemnation of
the department store, which did not qualify as slum property,82 by
advancing that it would be more convenient if the Agency had the power
to take every property within a designated redevelopment area, rather
than actually discerning between the slum and nonslum properties. The
Court then established for Congress a virtually unlimited eminent
domain power by stating that "[o]nce the question of the public purpose
has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the
80. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 49-50.
81. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (citing Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525,529-30
(1894)). The means-ends discussion within the pages cited by the Court established that
"Congress ... may create corporations as appropriate means of executing the powers of
government . . . [and may] use its sovereign powers, [either] directly or through a
corporation created for that object, to construct bridges for the accommodation of
interstate commerce." Luxton, 153 U.S. at 529-30 (citations omitted). Therefore, a
private entity granted authority by Congress to construct a bridge may exercise the power
of eminent domain to acquire land needed for the project. See id. To further support its
decision to defer to Congress's choice of means, the Berman Court referenced the holding
in Highland Russel Car & Snowplow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1929). Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. At
issue in Highland was Congress's ability to legislatively empower the President to fix the
price of coal during wartime. Highland, 279 U.S. at 258, 260, 262. In challenging a lower
court's decision that he was required to sell coal at a price established by the President, the
plaintiff asserted that the price-fixing deprived him of his liberty to contract in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Takings Clause. Id. at 258. The
defendant was producing snowplows for railroads during World War I and because of the
railroads' extreme need for such equipment, the Court stated that "[u]nquestionably, the
production of such equipment was in the state of war then prevailing a public use for
which coal and other private property might have been taken by exertion of the power of
eminent domain." Id. at 260 (emphasis added). Despite the Berman Court's reliance on
these two cases, the facts in Luxton and Highland are inapposite to the facts in Berman,
and accordingly, neither case should have been relied upon by the Court in Berman.
Compare Berman, 348 U.S. at 31, 34, with Highland, 279 U.S. at 257-58, and Luxton, 153
U.S. at 534.
82. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31 (stating the undisputed claim by the condemnee that his
property "is not slum housing").
83. Id. at 35 (stating that "[if owner after owner were permitted to resist these
redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being used
against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly").
Later, the Court stated that
[i]t is not for the courts to determine whether it is necessary for successful
consummation of the project that unsafe, unsightly, or insanitary buildings alone
be taken or whether title to the land be included, any more than it is the function
of the courts to sort and choose among the various parcels selected for
condemnation.
Id. at 36.
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project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan
rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." 4 Thus, even when a
taking is unnecessary to improve the public health and therefore not a
proper exercise of eminent domain under the police power justification, 5
and, even though property is not devoted to a public use, so long as "the
public purpose" has been decided for the project as a whole, the taking
does not offend the Constitution.8' The Berman decision firmly
established that redevelopment agencies of municipalities have unlimited
leeway in how they employ eminent domain to remedy slum and blight
conditions. s7
2. Midkiff
Hawaii's legislature "concluded that concentrated land ownership was
responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market [and]
inflating land prices,"88 and offered the Land Reform Act of 1967 (Act)
as the solution.' The Act "created a mechanism for condemning
residential tracts and for transferring ownership" of the condemned land
to those leasing the land from the owners.9° The constitutionality of the
Act was successfully challenged in the Ninth Circuit, which held that the
84. Id. at 35-36 (citing Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893)
(involving the condemnation of land for a national park)); United States ex rel. Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 547, 554 (1946) (involving condemnation of land so that it
may be flooded by a federally created utility company and the subsequent transfer of that
land to the National Park Service); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 232 (1946)
(involving the condemnation of land for a U.S. Post Office and U.S. Custom House).
85. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (citing public health and safety as "some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal
affairs").
86. Id. at 35-36. For the Court, "[tihe rights of these property owners are satisfied
when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price
of taking." Id. at 36.
87. Id.
88. Iaw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). In the 1960s Hawaii was
still an oligarchical state, with forty-seven percent of the privately owned land in the state
owned by seventy-two people. Id.
89. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516-186 (Michie 2000). The legislature passed the Act
because large landowners resisted attempts by the state to persuade them to sell their land
outright, citing the significant federal tax liabilities that would follow. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
233. Such tax liabilities are avoided under the Act because a condemnation constitutes an
involuntary conversion under the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 1033(a) provides that
"[i]f property (as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft, seizure, or requisition
or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily or involuntarily
converted-[ilnto property similar or related in service or use to the property so
converted, no gain shall be recognized." I.R.C. § 1033(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
90. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. Condemnation did not occur until after a public hearing
to determine whether the transfer of ownership of the land to lessees would "'effectuate
the public purposes' of the Act." Id. (emphasis added).
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legislative scheme resulted in a "naked attempt on the part of the state of
Hawaii to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for
B's private use and benefit."91
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 92 and extended
Berman's deferential approach to all legislative determinations of public
use.93  Providing welcome clarity, the Court began its opinion by
explicitly stating that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
"made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment., 94
In its evaluation of the Act under the Public Use Clause, the Court
summarized the Berman decision by stating that "[t]he 'public use'
requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers., 95 The Court acknowledged that there is "a role for courts to
play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public
use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the police
power," 6 but echoed the Berman Court by stating that the scope of that
review is "'extremely narrow."' 97 For further support of its deferential
approach to the Hawaii Legislature's public use determination, the Court
noted that the Berman Court cited with approval Old Dominion and
Welch, 98 neither of which involved a public-private taking.99 It then
offered one final case for support of the deferential approach-
Gettysburg Electricl° - also not a public-private taking case.' °1
The Court then continued its trend of moving away from the actual
language of the Public Use Clause by replacing the term public use with
the term "public purpose."'8 2 This linguistic trick allowed the Court to
91. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
92. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
93. Id. at 240-41 (following a discussion of Berman's deferential approach, the Court
stated that "[o]n this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act is
constitutional").
94. Id. at 231.
95. Id. at 239-40.
96. Id. at 240.
97. Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
98. Id. at 240-41.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 52, 55; see supra note 57 and accompanying
text.
100. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. The Court stated "that it will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation."' Id. (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co.,
160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
101. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (stating that "'one person's property may not be taken
for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose"' (emphasis
added) (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (upholding a
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state "where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." 103 The
Court then subjected the Act to this rational basis review and determined
that the Act survived scrutiny because the "redistribution of fees simple
to correct deficiencies in the market.. . attributable to land oligopoly is a
rational exercise of the eminent domain power."'0' 4 For the Court, the
fact that the taking was public-private did not automatically "condemn
that taking as having only a private purpose."'' 5 It supported this view by
errantly extending Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles,'°6 a public-
public taking case,0 7 to public-private takings, stating that "[t]he Court
long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be
put into use of the general public."'08 However, Rindge only tenuously
regulation that limited natural gas production without evaluating any public use claim)));
see also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 447 (1930)
(holding that the determination of public use is a judicial one); Madisonville Traction Co.
v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1905) (holding only that the question of
whether a taking is for a public use is a "suit" or "controversy" and therefore removable to
the federal courts under the Judiciary Act); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 159 (1896) (upholding a California irrigation act that allowed for the sale of an
individual's property if they did not pay their irrigation assessment). The Court then
summarized the holding in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896),
as "invalidat[ing] a compensated taking of property for lack of a justifying public
purpose," Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. A careful analysis of the Missouri Pacific case reveals
that the Court actually focused on the fact that the use of the property would be purely
private, rather than delving into an analysis of the public purpose of the taking. See 164
U.S. at 417.
103. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Rindge Co.
v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921);
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937)).
104. Id. at 242-43.
105. Id. at 243-44.
106. 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
107. Id. at 707-08 (holding that a taking for a public highway is for a public use). The
Rindge Court noted that the trial court "made specific findings that the public interest and
necessity required the acquisition of these public highways." Id. at 704. After land was
taken under the Hawaii Land Reform Act, it was held by private landowners for their own
residential purposes. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. In Rindge, after land was taken, it was
devoted for use as a public highway, accessible to all. Rindge, 262 U.S. at 701. The
Midkiff Court still maintained that "[a] purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of
government and would thus be void." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
108. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. The Court goes on to quote a portion of the Rindge
decision: "It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion,
... directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public
use."' Id. (omission and alteration in the original) (quoting Rindge, 262 U.S. at 707).
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supports this proposition 9 The Midkiff Court made clear that the Act
did not involve "purely private takings," but, unfortunately, offered no
guidance as to what would constitute a purely private taking."' At the
conclusion of the opinion, the Court summarized the deferential rule,
applicable in all takings cases, as follows: '[If a legislature, state or
federal, determines there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the
taking power, courts must defer to its determination that the taking will
serve a public use.'
F. Berman and Midkiff Lead State Courts To Allow Public-Private
Takings for Blight Clearance and Economic Development
1. Blight Clearance
After Berman firmly established the legality of using eminent domain
for slum and blight clearance,"2 cities throughout the United States
quickly began redevelopment of decaying urban areas by condemning
properties deemed slums or blighted."3 Because the term "blight" is
amorphous, 4 and because Berman and Midkiff allow courts to defer to
legislative determinations of blight,"5 redevelopment agencies are able to
condemn properties solely because they are located within an
economically depressed area."6  Several state courts, including the
109. Rindge, 262 U.S. at 708 (stating that "in these days of general public travel in
motor cars for health and recreation, such a highway as this, extending for more than
twenty miles along the shores of the Pacific at the base of a range of mountains, must be
regarded as a public use," indicating that the Court envisioned that the highway would be
widely used by the public).
110. Midkiff. 467 U.S. at 245.
111. Id. at 244. Hereinafter the deferential approach to public-private takings
introduced in Berman and solidified in Midkiff will be referred to as the "deferential rule."
112. See supra text accompanying note 87.
113. Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 47 (2003). Although not
explicitly defining "slum," the Berman Court defined "substandard housing" as that which
has a "lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light," or housing that suffers from
"dilapidation, overcrowding, [or] faulty interior arrangement." Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 28 n.* (1954). One commentator defines "blight" as "a disease that threaten[s] to
turn healthy areas into slums." Pritchett, supra, at 3.
114. Pritchett, supra note 113, at 3.
115. See supra text accompanying note 85; see supra text accompanying note I H.
t16. See City of Las Vegas Downtown Development Auth. v. Pappas, 76 P.3d I (Nev.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603 (2004). The court in Pappas upheld the condemnation
of an individual's three commercial properties and subsequent transfer of those properties
to a private developer. Id. at 17. The property fell within a particular area of downtown
Las Vegas that was designated for redevelopment due to economic depression. Id. at 6-7.
Professor Pritchett argues that the motivation behind "urban renewal" and blight
clearance projects often is to clear areas of minorities, particularly African-Americans. He
goes so far as to say that "[iun cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known
2005] The Need for a New Public Use Rule 1019
Nevada Supreme Court in City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment
Agency v. Pappas,"7 have upheld these public-private takings even
though the transferee was a private developer who intended to use the
property for the same purpose as the condemnee."8
2. Economic Development
Once Berman was decided, it was unclear if any condemnation would
violate the Public Use Clause." 9 As a result, municipalities also began
using eminent domain to take nonblight property purely for economic
development.1 20 In Michigan, the state legislature gave municipalities the
authority to create Economic Development Corporations (EDC). The
EDCs were given the power of eminent domain for the purposes of
combating unemployment and encouraging the retention of employers. " '
At the insistence of General Motors, 122 the city of Detroit's EDC
condemned a middle-class Polish neighborhood and then transferred the
as 'Negro removal."' Pritchett, supra note 113, at 46-47. He describes the effects of these
programs as "uproot[ing] hundreds of thousands of people, disrupt[ing] fragile urban
neighborhoods, and help[ing] to entrench racial segregation in the inner city." Id. at 47.
117. 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003).
118. See id. at 17; W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121
(App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1191 (2003). The commercial properties at issue in
W. 41st St. were all in the general vicinity of Times Square in New York City and had been
designated as blight for approximately twenty years. Id. at 124. The condemnees argued
that such labeling contributed to any existing blight conditions because it hindered the
attraction of new tenants. Id. The developer planned to construct a high-rise office
building, also a commercial use, with The New York Times as the main tenant. Id.
Nonetheless, the court upheld the condemnations and planned transfer of the properties
to a private developer because "the anticipated outcomes of this project clearly serve[d] a
public purpose by eliminating a pernicious blight which [hadl impaired the economic
development of a midtown Manhattan neighborhood." Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
119. EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 179.
120. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981).
121. Id. at 458. Under Michigan's Economic Development Corporations Act, an
individual may petition a municipality's governing body to request authorization to
incorporate an economic development corporation (EDC). MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 125.1604 (1997). If the application is approved, the municipality's chief executive officer
or chairperson of the county's board of commissioners appoints the board of directors for
the EDC. Id. After incorporation is complete, the EDC may begin its operations. Id.
§ 125.1605. An EDC's powers include the ability to condemn land and transfer it to
private developers, so long as the action fulfills the purposes of the Act. Id. § 125.1607.
The purposes of the Act, in part, are to "alleviate and prevent conditions of
unemployment" and "to assist and retain local industrial and commercial enterprises." Id.
§ 125.1602.
122. See Scott, supra note 13, at 471 (discussing how the chairman of General Motors
told the mayor of Detroit that the company intended to relocate its Cadillac plant outside
of the Detroit area unless the city provided a larger replacement site by May 1, 1981).
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land to General Motors so it could construct a new automobile
manufacturing plant.
2 3
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,14 the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the condemnation under
Michigan's own public use clause125 because the project was for a
1276permissible public purpose. The court relied in part on Berman for
127
support of the public use determination. This case provides a clear
example of a public-private taking initiated exclusively for economic
development. 28 Soon after it was decided, other states began to rely on
Poletown for justification of the use of eminent domain for other
economic development activities. 29  Once Midkiff established the
deferential rule, states employed eminent domain to more easily
123. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
124. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
125. MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2 states that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation."
126. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459. The court subjected the taking to heightened
scrutiny and held that when "the condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits
specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny the
claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced." Id. at 459-60.
Nonetheless, the court was satisfied that the project was "warranted on the basis that its
significance for the people of Detroit and the state [had] been demonstrated." Id. at 460.
This demonstrates the possible outcome when a heightened scrutiny approach is taken
without a categorical rule. Id. 459-60.
127. Id. at 459 (summarizing Berman as setting forth the rule "that when a legislature
speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms 'well-nigh conclusive'" (quoting
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954))).
128. Id. at 458. The Act authorizing the taking included a statement that "'tjhere
exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of
unemployment, and that it is accordingly necessary to assist and retain local industries."'
Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.1602). The purpose of the Act was accomplished
by takings like the one involved in this case. Id. The Poletown decision has been cited by
commentators as an example of a taking for economic development that went too far,
resulting in the decimation of an entire middle class neighborhood. See, e.g., Scott, supra
note 13, at 470 (describing Poletown as the "largest, most controversial, and most socially
disruptive public-private taking to date [that] resulted in the destruction of an entire city
neighborhood for the benefit of a single large corporation").
129. See, e.g., City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 n.2 (Minn. 1986). In City of
Duluth, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld as constitutional under both the state and
Federal Public Use Clauses the condemnation of a food processing plant and transfer of
that property to a private entity for the construction of a paper mill. Id. at 760, 764. As a
part of its justification, the court stated "[a]ppellate courts in other jurisdictions have also
determined that proposals to condemn and transfer property from one private owner to
another are justified on the ground that the economic benefit that results is 'public' in
nature." Id. at 763 n.2 (citing Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339
A.2d 278 (Md. 1975); Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455(Mich. 1981)).
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assemble land for private developers, all in the name of economic
development.13
0
The Connecticut Supreme Court decision Kelo v. City of New
London... is now at the center of the Public Use Clause debate;3 2 the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on February 22, 2005. '33
In the lower courts, the central issue was whether the Connecticut and
Federal Constitutions authorized a public-private taking of nonblight
property, albeit in an economically underperforming area, in the name of
economic development. '3 Two of the properties targeted for
condemnation were apartments held by the condemnees as
investments, 5 and the transferee in the case planned to construct
commercial office buildings. 116 Curiously, an adjacent property that is
part of the redevelopment plan will "provide for approximately eighty
new residences.' 3 7 The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that it has, in
the past, deferred to legislative determinations of public use,' 38 and that
130. See, e.g., Sun Co. v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 625 N.Y.S.2d 371, 377-
78 (App. Div. 1995) (upholding the condemnation of land and subsequent transfer to a
retail mall developer as being for a public purpose).
131. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
132. Id. at 511; see Will, supra note 34 (summarizing the impact of the case by posing
the question: "what home or business will be safe from grasping governments pursuing
their own convenience").
133. Oral Argument, Kelo v. City of New London (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 529436.
134. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 507. The trial court determined that one of the motivating
factors behind the development plan was to "benefit the distressed city," further
complicating any rational distinction between this case and the Pappas case. Compare id.
at 540, with City of Las Vegas Downtown Development Auth. v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 6-7
(2003) (discussing the reasons for the blight designation), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603
(2004). The wrinkle in Kelo is that the transfer of the property interest to the private
entity comes in the form of a ninety-nine year ground lease, where a statutorily created
development corporation retains title to the property while the ultimate transferee will be
a private entity. 843 A.2d at 510.
135. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 511.
136. Id. at 509 (describing the proposed use as "90,000 square feet of high technology
research and development office space and parking").
137. Id. Because the property is presently used to provide rental housing, and the
adjacent property in the redevelopment plan will include rental housing, the taking not
only seems unnecessary, but also in violation of Justice McLean's position in Dix that the
new use for the property must be different from the prior use. See supra text
accompanying note 33.
138. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 523-25. The court noted that the development plan would
generate construction jobs, direct jobs, indirect jobs, and additional property tax revenues
by stating:
The development plan is expected to generate approximately between: (1) 518
and 867 construction jobs; (2) 718 and 1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940
indirect jobs. The composite parcels of the development plan also are expected
to generate between $680,544 and $1,249,843 in property tax revenues for the
city, in which 54 percent of the land area is exempt from property taxes.
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the U.S. Supreme Court in Berman and Midkiff gave deferential
treatment in those cases to legislative public use determinations.
39
Ultimately, the Connecticut Supreme Court held, relying in part on
Poletown, that the economic development projects and the coinciding
condemnations "satisfy the public use clauses of the state and federal
constitutions. ",4°
G. A Return to Reason: The Michigan Supreme Court Overturns
Poletown
In July of 2004, Michigan returned to the ranks of states like Illinois,
which disallows public-private takings purely for economic
development, 14' by overturning its Poletown decision in County of Wayne
v. Hathcock. 42 In Hathcock, Wayne County was attempting to acquire
land by eminent domain and then transfer that land to a private
Id. at 510.
139. Id. at 525-26.
140. Id. at 520, 528. The Connecticut Supreme Court, in its discussion of its "sister
states"' decisions upholding as public uses public-private takings for economic
development, makes a point to discuss what it views as the positive attributes of the
Poleiown decision. Id. at 528. The court describes the case as "[a] landmark case relying
on legislative and redevelopment agency declarations and upholding, under the state
constitution, the taking of private homes for the construction of a major manufacturing
assembly plant." Id. It went so far as to devote a lengthy footnote to discussing the merits
of the case which included a statement that "Poletown warrants further discussion because
it illustrates amply how the use of eminent domain for a development project that benefits
a private entity nevertheless can rise to the level of a constitutionally valid public benefit."
Id. n.39.
141. See, e.g., Southwestern I11. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9-
11 (111. 2002) (declaring unconstitutional a taking with economic development and benefits
inuring exclusively to a private party, in part because the public would not be guaranteed
the right of enjoying and using the property). The Illinois Supreme Court specifically
stated that "revenue expansion alone does not justify an improper and unacceptable
expansion of the eminent domain power of the government." Id. at 10-11. Worth noting
is the fact that the Southwestern Illinois Development Authority had a rather unscientific
way of determining which properties it would condemn: it created a Quick-Take
Application Packet, and once it was completed and the required fees were paid, it
submitted the application to the governing body which held one hearing on the matter; the
condemnation proceedings began soon thereafter. Id. at 4-5. Illinois and Michigan are
not alone in declaring takings unconstitutional because of an insufficient public use. See
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 96 (1986)
(discussing his 1986 study, which determined that 16.2% of state court decisions evaluating
public use claims determined that no public use existed); see also Casino Reinvestment
Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (declaring
unconstitutional the public-private taking for the purpose of expanding a casino parking
lot).
142. 684 N.W.2d 765,787 (Mich. 2004).
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developer so that the developer could build a business park."' Several
condemnees filed motions to review the necessity of the proposed
condemnations, arguing that Poletown should be overruled because its
public purpose test was an incorrect interpretation of the Michigan
Constitution's public use clause. 44
The Michigan Supreme Court systematically analyzed the original
meaning of the Michigan constitution's public use clause1 45  and
established a new categorical rule for determining the constitutionality of
public-private takings.1 46 The new rule states that public-private takings
are constitutional only
(1) where "public necessity of the extreme sort" requires
collective action; (2) where the property remains subject to
public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and (3) where
the property is selected because of "facts of independent public
significance," rather than the interests of the private entity to
which the property is eventually transferred.147
Category (1) would include "'highways, railroads, canals, and other
instrumentalities of commerce."' 148  Category (2) would include
condemnations undertaken by privately owned utility companies or
private-private takings, 149 where the company is subject to state
143. Id. at 770-71. The parcels of land at issue were adjacent to the recently renovated
and expanded Metropolitan Airport. Id. at 770. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) provided funds to Wayne County to help it purchase property adjacent to the
airport in order to abate the noise effects of the expansion. Id. The FAA required that
the land acquired "be put to economically productive use." Id. The county conceived of
the business park in order to meet this requirement. Id.
144. Defendants-Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 36-46, County of Wayne v. Hathcock
(No. 124070). In other words, the condemnees argued "that the Pinnacle Project would
not serve a public purpose." Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
145. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-83. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed its pre-
Poletown jurisprudence to arrive at the three-category rule. Id. It soundly justified this
approach by recognizing that "[t]he primary objective in interpreting a constitutional
provision is to determine the text's original meaning to the ratifiers." Id. at 779. Because
the constitutional provision at issue in Hathcock dated back to 1850, the court analyzed
case law existing prior to 1963 to determine the provision's original meaning. Id. at 780-81
(explaining that this approach would reveal the "'common understanding' among those
sophisticated in the law at the time of the Constitution's ratification"). The Michigan
Supreme Court, in establishing a categorical rule, must have drawn from its experience in
Poletown, where it upheld a public-private taking for economic development even under
heightened scrutiny. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459-60 (Mich. 1981).
146. Id. at 783.
147. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478-79 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)). This was the rule urged by Justice Ryan in his Poletown dissent. Id. at 781.
148. Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
149. See supra note 39 (describing the qualities of a private-private taking).
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regulation.150 Category (3) would include condemnations where the
"controlling purpose in condemning the properties [is] to remove unfit
housing and thereby advance public health and safety," and the
"subsequent resale of the land cleared of blight [is] 'incidental' to this
goal. '51 The court determined that this three-category rule accurately
captures the public-private takings that are constitutional under the
original meaning of the Michigan public use clause.' It thereby adopted•531 5 4
Justice Ryan's dissent in Poletown"3 and overturned Poletown itself.
II. CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE DEFERENTIAL RULE
A. Berman and Midkiff's Deferential Rules Were Improper
In order to return meaning to the Public Use Clause, the Supreme
Court's decision in Berman should be overturned for three reasons.
First, Berman allows legislatures to exercise the police power, through
eminent domain, irrespective of the restraint of the Fifth Amendment.1
5
Second, its deferential rule is a departure from the Supreme Court's
prior approach to public-private takings. 6 And third, because it allows
for a public-private taking when no change in the character of the land is
intended, it conflicts with Justice McLean's concurrence in West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix"' and the original meaning of the Public Use Clause.
The first and most pressing reason to overturn Berman is that it
expressly permits legislatures to exercise the police power, through
eminent domain,' 59 to take property without having to consider the rights
of the individual guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.' 60 This
unconstrained power is permissible under Berman when, for example,
the legislature has decided that its governed land area "should be
150. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (discussing Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v Dehn, 64
N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1954), in which the state court upheld a condemnation and transfer of
property to a private entity for the construction of a petroleum pipeline because the state
required that the pipeline be used to further intrastate commerce, and would be able to
enforce directives from the Michigan Public Service Commission).
151. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
152. Id. at 780-81, 783.
153. Id. at 781 (stating that "Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent accurately describes the
factors that distinguish" permissible and impermissible public-private takings).
154. Id. at 787.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 159-67.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 168-71.
157. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 537 (1848); see supra text accompanying note 33.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 173-76.
159. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
160. See id.
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beautiful as well as sanitary.'' 6 When eminent domain is exercised for
these purposes, under the express language of Berman, the property
owner is no longer guaranteed due process162 or that the property will be
devoted to a public use.163 The Court further broadened the scope of this
unconstrained power of eminent domain to all circumstances where the
"object is within the authority of Congress," making "eminent domain
•.. merely the means to the end."' '6 This implies that so long as Congress
is exercising an enumerated power, it can do so without considering the
Bill of Rights. Because state legislative bodies possess the police power,
the Berman decision permits them to exercise eminent domain without
constraint by the Fifth Amendment as well, with the only constraint
being judicial review under state law.66 Berman's dismissal of individual
rights in favor of legislative power is a stunning departure from the
.... 166
Supreme Court's treatment of other individual rights, and has led to
many ill-conceived urban renewal programs. Therefore, Berman
should be overturned.
161. Id. at 33.
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
163. See id.
164. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
165. Id. at 32. The Court stated that "[t]he power of Congress over the District of
Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power." Id.
at 31-32. Therefore, if the Berman Court does seek to control Congress's usc of eminent
domain through the Public Use Clause, and states also possess the power of eminent
domain, this must mean that the Public Use Clause also does not serve as a restraint on
the states.
166. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(holding that nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment
free speech rights are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny).
167. See Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development Tool: A
Proposal To Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L.
901, 936-37 (discussing studies documenting the inhumane nature of "forced dislocation"
caused by urban renewal projects sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and faulting the programs for "destroying people's lives and killing
their neighborhoods with badly planned social engineering"). The impact of urban
renewal projects during the 1950s and 1960s on the availability of low-cost housing was
staggering. These projects demolished 126,000 housing units and erected only 28,000 in
their place, the majority of which commanded higher rent. Id. at 938. This inevitably led
to an affordable housing crisis in the cities where the urban renewal projects took place.
Id. at 939-40. The author points out the problem with assessing the true cost of the
displacement of residents by stating that "a displaced community's most valuable asset loss
may be its most unmeasurable: the destruction of the community itself." Id. at 941. This
makes just compensation practically impossible because the legislative schemes "do not
take into account citywide displacement costs, or 'loss of amenities and neighborhood."'
Id. at 942 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Warren Court, 31
TULSA L.J. 643, 674 (1996)). The author states that the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655
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The second reason to overturn Berman is because its deferential rule
departs from prior public-private takings decisions, which established
that these types of takings should be closely scrutinized."" The Supreme
Court's express language in both Gettysburg Electric and Brown indicates
that the constitutional evaluation of public-private takings under the
Public Use Clause requires, at the very least, a heightened scrutiny
analysis.' 69 Additionally, considering that the condemnee's property in
Berman was not slum property,170 the taking can only be classified as a
public-private taking for economic development, which the Brown Court
strongly disfavored.'
The third reason to overturn Berman concerns the use of the
condemnee's land-it did not change after the taking, which Justice
McClean's concurrence in Dix counsels against, and which runs afoul
of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause. In Berman, the
condemnee used his property for commercial purposes and, after the
condemnation, the new owner of the property also held the property for
commercial purposes.174 As such, the use of the property is no more
public than it was before.'75 Further, by not requiring a change in the use
of the property in a public-private taking, Madison's hope that the Public
Use Clause would serve as a "paper barrier" between the government
176
and private property is torn to pieces.
The deferential rule established in Midkiff 77 also must be overturned
because Midkiff relied on Berman for its support.178  As established
(2000), which aimed to minimize the impact of displacement, "does not push agencies to
consider displacement's more general effects, nor does it require that federal financial
assistance providers, like HUD, consider the costs of displacement when evaluating a
project's viability and cost-effectiveness," id. at 948-49.
168. Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 83 (1923); United States v. Gettysburg Elec.
Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896). For the quoted text in Gettysburg Electric and Brown,
see supra text accompanying note 41 and supra note 50, respectively.
169. Cf Scott, supra note 13, at 474-78 (identifying six elements that should trigger
heightened scrutiny when present in public-private condemnations: "[p]roperty [o]wned or
[l]eased by a [s]ingle [p]rivate [e]ntity," "[n]o [d]irect [p]ublic [blenefits by [r]ight," "[u]se
of [q]uick-[t]ake [c]ondemnation [p]rocedure," "[p]roposed [b]eneficiary [rlequests
[ilnitiation of [c]ondemnation [p]rocess, [e]xercises [s]ignificant [i]nfluence, or [b]oth,"
"[p]roposed [b]eneficiary [m]akes [n]o [g]uarantee [a]bout [c]ontinued [p]ublic [u]se," and
"[p]rior [e]xisting [land use] [p]lanning [d]ocuments [flail to [a]ddress [pjroposed [u]se").
170 See supra text accompanying note 73.
171. Brown, 263 U.S. at 84; see supra note 50.
172. See supra text accompanying note 33.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
174. See EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 179 (stating that "Berman is in a sense an extreme
case, because the condemned property was left in its original condition").
175. See supra note 35.
176. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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above, Berman's deferential review of a public-private taking was a
departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent and ran afoul of the
original meaning of the Public Use Clause. 17  Therefore, the Midkiff
Court's reliance on Berman for support of the deferential rule was
flawed.' 8 Thus, the Midkiff Court should not have afforded deference to
the Hawaii legislature's public use determination.
Additionally, Midkiffs deferential rule should be overturned because
the cases cited in Midkiff did not involve public-private takings, 8 further
weakening the Court's decision. When the Court applied a rational basis
test to the Hawaii Land Reform Act, it supported this approach to
reviewing the statute again by citing cases that did not involve public-
private takings. 2 And when the Court confidently asserted that it "long
ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put
into use for the general public,.. 8 it cited to Rindge Co. v. County of Los
Angeles,4 a public-public taking case that does not support that• • 185
proposition.' Because the Midkiff Court used Berman186 and cases that
178. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76.
181. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240-41. The Court cited United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946), which was a public-public taking, Midkiff, 467
U.S. at 240 ("'[Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts deciding
on what is and is not a governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the
basis of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved
impracticable in other fields."' (quoting Welch, 327 U.S. at 552)). See supra note 57, for
the facts of the case. The Court also cited Gettysburg Electric for support and, again, that
case did not involve a public-private taking. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 ("In short, the Court
has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to
what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation."'
(quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896))). See supra
note 38, for the facts of Gettysburg Electric.
182. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 ("But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." (citing Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (holding
that a taking of land for a public highway constituted a permissible public-public taking);
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (rejecting on the basis of a wartime exigency-a
housing crisis in Washington, D.C., caused by World War I-a due process and public use
claim); Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (upholding a regulation that
limited natural gas production, without evaluating any public use claim)).
183. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. The Court further stated that "'[i]t is not essential that
the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, ... directly enjoy or participate
in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use."' Id. (omission and second
alteration in original) (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707
(1923)).
184. 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
185. See supra notes 107, 109. The Court in Rindge did not defer to the judgment of
the condemning authority that the taking constituted a public use, but instead believed it
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were not on point 8 7 to support its deviation from Supreme Court
precedent establishing that public-private takings shall be subject to at
least a heightened level of review,"' its deferential rule must be
overturned.'89
B. Proposed Alternatives to the Deferential Rule
The decisions in Berman and Midkiff sparked an outcry from the
academic community, with protest centered on the Court's deferential
review.' 09  Of the various alternate levels of review advanced by
commentators, the most restrictive commentator advocates a rule where
all public-private takings undergo a strict-scrutiny analysis, even when
the condemning authority is a public utility.'9' If state courts or the
"should keep in view the diversity of such conditions and regard with great respect the
judgments of state courts upon what should be deemed public uses in any state." Rindge,
262 U.S. at 705-06. This allows state courts to defer to legislative determinations of public
use, but in the Court's express words, it only allows the Supreme Court to "regard with
great respect the judgments of state courts." Id. at 706.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 178.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
189. See EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 180-81 (discussing the Midkiff and the Hawaii
Land Reform Act, and declaring that "[l1and reform ... runs afoul of the public use
limitation").
190. See id. at 178-81; POLLOT, supra note 27, at 110-12 (criticizing the deferential rule
of Berman and Midkiff because making public use determinations "is precisely the role of
the courts under the provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights"); SCHULTZ,
supra note 34, at 60-61. Schultz states that
[i]n affirming the expanding scope of eminent domain power, and in giving to
Congress the final say to determine a valid public use, the Court [in Berman and
Midkif]] has stated that property rights pose no substantive limit on the
legislatures as long as laws authorizing the acquisition of the property exist and
just compensation is paid for the property.
Id. at 61; Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49, 67-70
(1999) (citing the Court-packing scandal surrounding the New Deal as a possible reason
for the relaxed judicial role and advocating for an increased judicial role in public use
determinations); Merrill, supra note 141, at 90; Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent
Domain Law: An Argument.for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement
of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285 (2000).
191. See Jones, supra note 190, at 305-12. But cf SCHULTZ, supra note 34, at 196
(advocating the "principles of Midkiff-that is, that the state should have broad discretion
to use eminent domain to achieve important social welfare goals" in addition to narrowing
"the implications of Poletown, which supported the use of eminent domain to the
advantage of corporate or majority interests at the expense of individual liberty, minority
interests, and genuine democratic decision making"); Thomas J. Posey, Note, This Land Is
My Land: The Need .for a Feasibility Test in Evaluation of Takings for Public Necessity, 78
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1417 (2003) (advocating "judicial review of the feasibility of
proposed necessity projects . . . where the government is highly unlikely to use the
condemned land to complete the necessity project").
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Supreme Court were to adopt this approach, condemnation trials would
be lengthened because of the additional proof requirements needed to
pass a strict scrutiny analysis." 2 Such additional proof and strict scrutiny
review is inappropriate in cases where the private entity condemning and
then holding the property is a public utility because the Supreme Court
prior to Berman declared such a taking to be for a public use.9
Property law scholar Richard A. Epstein proposes a requirement that
a taking only be declared a public use if it constitutes a "public good" in
an economic sense. 94 In order for something to be deemed a publicS 195
good, there must be no exclusivity to its enjoyment and the cost of an
additional unit of production must be marginal.' 9 Additionally, the
benefit derived from the taking itself should be shared equally by the
public'97-no one party should enjoy more than their pro rata share of
the "surplus" generated by the taking.'9 Epstein uses national defense as
an example of a public good because the benefits derived from this
government service are enjoyed by all while the cost of protecting one
additional individual is minute.9 9 Epstein does not advocate that courts
undergo such an economic analysis in public-public takings for highways
or parks where "individuals have the right to use the facility."2°° But,
because he only offers highways and public parks as permissible public
uses under his pro rata share approach, he offers little guidance to help
courts streamline the process of determining which public-private takings
lead to the transferee enjoying more than his pro rata share. 21 Without
any guidance, this approach would overburden courts by requiring them
192. See Jones, supra note 190, at 311-12. The author advocates that "[ulnder strict
scrutiny analysis, the condemning authority must demonstrate a compelling public need.
[.. ITihe means chosen must be necessary to achieve the compelling objectivef,] ... [and]
the state must show that benefiting third party [sic] exhausted every avenue of purchase
on the open market." Id.
193. See Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908) (holding that
deference to state court determinations that a public utility serves a public purpose is
appropriate).
194. EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 166-69.
195. Id. at 166 (stating that "the element of exclusivity ... cannot be satisfied in the
provision of any public good").
196. Id.
197. Id. at 174 ("The public use requirement is satisfied only when efforts are made to
replicate in the transfer situation the same distribution of costs and benefits that is found
with normal public goods.").
198. Id. at 164.
199. Id. at 166.
200. Id. at 166-68.
201. Id. at 167-68.
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to undergo an economic analysis in every public-private condemnation. 2°2
Epstein's approach requires more refinement before it can become
incorporated into a workable rule.
Legal scholar Thomas W. Merrill offers a rule that requires a
heightened scrutiny analysis of condemnation decisions when one or
more of the following conditions is met: "high subjective value, potential
for secondary rent seeking, and intentional or negligent thick market
bypass. 20 3 This proposal proves unworkable for several reasons. First,
every condemnee could easily satisfy the condition of high subjective
value by offering convincing testimony about emotional attachment to
the subject property, leading to unnecessarily exorbitant condemnation
awards. 204 Second, Merrill's definition of secondary rent- "where one or
a small number of persons will capture a taking's surplus," 20 5- is very
similar to Epstein's public goods formula, z2 and would, therefore, prove
as unworkable as Epstein's approach.2 7  Third, most state eminent
domain statutes do not allow for "intentional or negligent thick market
bypass, defined as using eminent domain to deliberately and
• . 209
unnecessarily bypass a free-market exchange to acquire property. In
most states, prior to initiating condemnation proceedings, the
condemning authority must make a good faith offer to purchase the
210property, thereby addressing Merrill's concern that condemning
authorities will abuse eminent domain by using it to bypass a free-market
211
exchange.
202. See, e.g., John J. Delaney, Avoiding Regulatory Wipe-Outs: Proposed Model
Legislation for a Local Mechanism, in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 453, 457 (Am. Law Inst., Am. Bar Ass'n Continuing Legal
Educ. 1999) (1998), WL SE18 ALI-ABA (stating that "public sector spokespersons...
claim that performing economic analyses in advance of regulatory actions would be too
burdensome and time consuming [when required by condemnation legislative schemes]").
203. See Merrill, supra note 141, at 90.
204. See id. at 83-84 (mentioning "sentimental attachment" as one of the determining
factors of subjective value, while later admitting that "subjective value is inherently
difficult to measure").
205. Id. at 87. The "surplus" is the added economic benefit resulting from the
condemnation which comes about because "a resource's value after condemnation is
almost always higher than before." Id. at 85.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
207. See supra text accompanying note 202.
208. Merrill, supra note 141, at 90; 6 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 24.13[1][a] (3d ed. 2002).
209. Merrill, supra note 141, at 88.
210. 6 SACKMAN,supra note 208, § 24.13[I][a].
211. See supra text accompanying notes 208-09.
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C. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Hathcock's Three-Category Rule
The most workable public use rule offered to date is the three-category
rule found in the Michigan case, County of Wayne v. Hathcock.212 By
only requiring courts to determine whether a taking fits within one of the
three categories, Michigan courts do not have to undergo an economic
analysis for every challenged taking,"' making the rule more workable
than Epstein's public goods rule '14 and Merrill's secondary rent seeking
analysis.21 Another benefit is that the holding itself indicates clearly that
public-private takings for economic development are impermissible. 6
The advantages of the Hathcock rule make it far more favorable than
Berman and Midkiff s deferential rule because rather than simply
deferring to legislative determinations of public use, the rule actually
attempts to define what is and what is not a public use when the
transferee is a private entity. 7
Despite its strengths, Hathcock's three-category rule needs refinement
to align it with the original meaning of the Public Use Clause and the
Supreme Court's pre-Berman Public Use Clause jurisprudence."' The
first characteristic of the rule requiring refinement is category (3),219
because it still permits condemnations "to remedy urban blight" without
defining the term blight. 2 ' The taking in Berman, although discouraged
• • 221
under pre-Berman Supreme Court jurisprudence, would remain
permissible under Hathcock's category (3) so long as "the property is
selected because of 'facts of independent public significance,' rather than
the interests of the private entity to which the property is eventually
transferred.
22
212. See supra text accompanying note 147-51.
213. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 194-202.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
216. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786-87.
217. Id. at 781-83 (articulating the three-category rule and applying it to common
condemnation scenarios).
218. See infra text accompanying notes 219-25.
219. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (defining category (3) as "where the property is
selected because of 'facts of independent significance,' rather than the interests of the
private entity to which the property is eventually transferred" (quoting Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 480 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting))).
220. Id.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
222. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)). The Supreme Court in Berman did not find that the taking was initiated at
the insistence of a private developer, but rather that the property was taken because it fell
within a "project area redevelopment plan." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954).
Ironically, almost anticipating the Hathcock decision, the court in Kelo fit a taking for
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The second problematic characteristic of the Hathcock rule is its
failure to require heightened scrutiny for "non-traditional" takings that
fall within category (1) or category (2).23 This is inappropriate because,
prior to Berman, the Brown Court required a thorough investigation of
the public nature of nontraditional public uses.2 4 Also, considering the
importance the founders, and particularly Madison, placed on property
rights, it would be inappropriate to allow legislatures to deprive
landowners of their property for newly contrived public uses without first
evaluating under heightened scrutiny analysis whether the use actually
would be "public."' -  Hathcock provides a starting point for a
economic development purposes into category (3) by stating that "municipal economic
development can be, in and of itself, a constitutionally valid public use under the well
established broad, purposive approach that we take on this issue under both the federal
and state constitutions." Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 532 (Conn.), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004). The court continued, "[The] private benefit from such
economic development is, just as in the blight and substandard housing clearance cases,
secondary to the public benefit that results from significant economic growth and
revitalized financial stability in a community." Id.
223. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. The text of the three-category rule does not
suggest a particular level of review to determine if takings fall within the permissible
categories. See id. The term "non-traditional" refers to newly declared public uses, as
opposed to uses long recognized as public, such as railroad tracks. See infra note 224 and
accompanying text.
224. See Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 81-84 (1923). Without a heightened level
of review, land reform actions like the one undertaken by the Hawaii Legislature in
Midkiff could fall within Hathcock's category (1) after only a rational basis review. The
argument would be that the need for an improved fee simple market constituted a "'public
necessity of the extreme sort"' and the Land Reform Act of 1967 constituted a "collective
action." See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)). Nonetheless, takings for these purposes cannot be considered traditional in
the same sense that takings for a highway or the construction of railroad tracks are
traditional because of the long history of using eminent domain for these purposes. See
W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 547 (1848) (McLean, J., concurring)
(listing turnpikes or roads as permissible public uses). The lack of a similar history in
Hawaii, prior to the Land Reform Act, of using eminent domain to improve a fee simple
market makes this a nontraditional use because there was no previous legislation offering
eminent domain as a solution to the fee simple concentration problem. See Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232-34 (1984) (summarizing the history of the Land
Reform Act of 1967). A rational basis review of the Act therefore would be inappropriate
because standing in the way of this taking is the need to determine if the new use of the
property is "public." See U.S. CONST. art. V. Without a prior decision that land reform
constitutes a public use, such a determination should be made only after strict scrutiny
analysis because of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause, see supra text
accompanying notes 20-28, and the Supreme Court's pre-Berman public-private
condemnation precedent, see supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28; cf. Jones, supra note 190, at 305-06
("Since the right to own property is a paramount right of a free republic, courts should
subject a third-party acquisition[, a public-private taking,] posed as a public taking to strict
scrutiny analysis.").
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comprehensive public-private taking rule. But, it requires more
refinement in order to once and for all create a universal rule for
determining a proper public use.
III. A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO DETERMINING A PUBLIC USE
A. The Test for Evaluating Public-Public Takings
When evaluating public-public takings, courts should generally employ
deferential review, best articulated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co.226 In a public-public taking,
deference is appropriate "when the legislature has declared the use or
purpose to be a public one . . . unless the use be palpably without
reasonable foundation." '227 This deference is appropriate because, when
the government will own the property after the condemnation, the risk is
much lower that the taking will not involve a public good.228
A necessary exception to this rule of deference exists when the use of
the property does not involve a public good, that is, when a small set of
private parties will enjoy more than their pro rata share of the benefits
created by the taking.229 Prior to triggering a public goods analysis, a
party challenging the taking must first advance a cognizable claim that
the government intends to hold the land primarily for the benefit of a
private party.30 Only then is it appropriate for the court to perform an
economic analysis to determine whether a private party will be the
primary beneficiary of the taking.2M This exception to the rule of
deference prevents governments from circumventing the public-private
takings prohibited by the rule, proposed below, by retaining ownership
of the land but entering into long-term ground leases with private parties
for non public uses, as New London is attempting to do in Kelo.232
226. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
227. Id. at 680.
228. See EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 167 (providing an example of a pure public good
and arguing that when property is taken by the United States for use as a "lighthouse or a
naval shore installation," there is a lower risk that a private party will enjoy more than its
pro rata share because no private party subsequently obtains an undivided interest in the
condemned property).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
230. See id.
231. But cf Merrill, supra note 141 (advocating an economic analysis for all public-
private takings).
232. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 510 (Conn.) cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 27 (2004).
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B. The "Two-Category Rule" and the Appropriate Level of Review for
Nontraditional Public Uses
In light of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause and the
Supreme Court's pre-Berman public-private takings jurisprudence,
public-private takings are permissible only "(1) where 'public necessity of
the extreme sort' requires collective action," and "(2) where the property
remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private entity.,
233
Additionally, takings under either category must result in a significant
change in the character of the use of the land. T4  Again, category (1)
takings traditionally are for uses like highways, bridges, and canals.235
Category (2) includes takings initiated by public utilities for uses such as
power lines, power plants, and water plants.236
To determine whether the proposed use of the land falls within one of
these two categories, courts must first determine if the use constitutes a
237traditional or nontraditional use. This determination of traditional or
nontraditional use requires courts to look to the original meaning of what
constituted a public use at the time of enactment of their respective
public use clauses, just as the Michigan Supreme Court did in
233. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (quoting Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 172-76. This rule will hereinafter be referred
to as the "Two-Category Rule." This rule adopts only category (1) and category (2) of the
rule set forth by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock. A categorical rule will be
more effective in determining what is a public use than simply requiring heightened
scrutiny when a private individual reaps more than his pro rata share of the benefits from
the taking. See supra note 145 (discussing the Michigan Supreme Court's abandonment of
a heightened scrutiny analysis in favor of a categorical rule in the context of public-private
takings).
235. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781.
236. Id. at 782. Takings by public utilities do not violate Epstein's public goods theory
so long as the service is available to all, allowing all to share in the benefits created by the
taking. EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 168-69.
237. See supra notes 223-24.
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Hathcock In the spirit of stare decisis, courts should only review a
taking for a traditional public use under a rational basis analysis.2 35
Where a use does not qualify as a traditional public use, Courts should
subject the legislative public use determination to strict scrutiny
analysis. 240 After the adoption of this rule, uses that at first may not have
been expressly understood as traditional public uses may become so after
the passage of time and changes in circumstances. This will happen,
241however, only after first undergoing a strict scrutiny analysis. Only if
the states utilize this rule to review public use determinations should
appellate courts defer to their determinations. 242
The final determination under the rule is whether or not the character
of the use will change significantly after the taking. 4  A significant
change in the character of the use prevents the type of taking Justice
244McClean abhorred in his Dix concurrence. It also would prevent the
condemnation reviewed in the Berman decision as well as condemnations
for slum clearance cases where the property use does not change.24' This
will help prevent factions from improperly influencing legislatures for
their own private benefit, which was one of Madison's primary purposes
238. See supra text accompanying note 145. For those states that enacted a public use
clause very early in their history, the inquiry should focus on the early eminent domain
court decisions and their declarations of what constitutes a public use. See id. For
example, in arid climates, takings for the construction of an irrigation infrastructure would
be classified as traditional because in that particular area irrigation has been deemed a
public use. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (upholding a
California irrigation act that allowed for the sale of an individual's property if the
individual did not pay his or her irrigation assessment).
239. Cf Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 599, 608 (1908) (upholding a
taking by a railroad company of land for a "spur track" by deferring to the state court's
determination that the taking was for a public use).
240. Cf Jones, supra note 190, at 305-14; see supra text accompanying note 223-25.
This proposal contemplates the traditional strict scrutiny analysis which requires a
showing of a compelling government interest, and a showing that the means of addressing
this interest are narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 235 (1995). This level of scrutiny considers the importance the Framers placed on the
protection of property rights. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
241. Cf Jones, supra note 190, at 305-14; see supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
242. But see Hairston, 208 U.S. at 607 (holding that it is appropriate to defer to a state
court determination that a taking was for a public use without determining whether the
use was traditional or nontraditional); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700,
705-06 (1923) (stating that the Supreme Court "should keep in view the diversity of [local]
conditions and regard with great respect the judgments of state courts upon what should
be deemed public uses in any state").
243. See supra text accompanying note 234.
244. See supra text accompanying note 33.
245. See supra text accompanying note 174.
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for proposing a Bill of Rights.' 46 An easy way of determining whether
there would be a change in the character of the use is to look to the
applicable zoning code, and then determine if the property's proposed
use would result in a change of the land use classification.
Note that not all takings purely for economic development are doomed
to fail the Two-Category test.24' For example, because railroad tracks can
246. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27. Applying this rule to the Midkiff facts,
the public use determination involved a nontraditional public use falling under category
(1). Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984) (summarizing the taking as "a
mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring ownership of the
condemned fees simple to existing lessees"). Therefore, the taking should have undergone
a strict scrutiny analysis in the Hawaii courts. Cf EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 180-81.
Rather than subjecting the Hawaii Land Reform Act to a strict scrutiny analysis, Epstein
argues that "[l]and reform ... runs afoul of the public use limitation" because the property
is not used for a public good and there is no "universal right of access." Id. at 181. The
Hawaii Land Reform Act would likely have failed a strict scrutiny analysis because other
less restrictive means were available to accomplish the legislature's goal of improving the
fee simple market, namely, by providing property tax relief to those landowners who sold
their property to the lessees. The landowners resisted compulsion by the legislature to sell
their land, "pointing out the significant federal tax liabilities they would incur.... [T]he
landowners claimed that the federal tax laws were the primary reason they previously had
chosen to lease, and not sell, their lands." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. Hawaii could have
abated real property taxes on the property that remained in the hands of the landowners
after they sold their property, by creating a formula that sought to "compensate" the
landowner for the federal tax liability incurred as a result of the sale of their property.
This scheme would leave the option to sell in the hands of the landowner, where it
belongs. As for the character of the use analysis, it would be difficult for a court to find
that the character of the use changed simply because a new person owns the property,
especially considering the land use classification remained residential. Id. Therefore
under the "Two-Category Rule" proposed by this Comment, the Hawaii Land Reform
Act of 1967 would be declared unconstitutional.
247. See infra text accompanying notes 248-50. However, a taking purely for economic
development like the one involved in Kelo would require an analysis under category (1) of
the Two-Category Rule, but only if the economic development constituted a "public
necessity of the extreme sort." See supra text accompanying note 233. The Hathcock
decision did not review the taking involved in the case under its own category (1), however
a shrewd litigator or legislator could argue that a taking for only economic development
purposes fits within category (1). County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783
(Mich. 2004) ("The exercise of eminent domain at issue here-the condemnation of
defendants' properties for the Pinnacle Project and the subsequent transfer of those
properties to private entities-implicates none of the saving elements noted by our pre-
1963 eminent domain jurisprudence."). The Michigan Supreme Court was persuaded by
Justice Ryan's dissent in Poletown and earlier precedent which narrowed category (1)
condemnations to takings for "'highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of
commerce.' Id. at 781 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)). Nonetheless, most litigators or
legislators would find it difficult to argue that condemning and razing an apartment
building in order to build a larger one right next door constitutes a "public necessity of the
extreme sort." See supra text accompanying notes 135-37. These are the facts presented
in Kelo. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37. Any honest legislator knows that
private developers or corporations prefer the government to acquire the land through
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only be laid in a certain way, condemnations for this reason generally will
have no problem passing the test under category (1) because, not only
248beas wihu
are they traditional public uses, but also because without
condemnation, it would be cost-prohibitive for railroad companies to
assemble the land necessary to lay the tracks. Additionally, these takings
also fall within the purview of category (2) because railroad companies
are subject to rigorous government oversight. 24' Therefore, one cannot
declare categorically that public-private or private-private takings for
economic development do not constitute a public use, because otherwise
condemnations for instrumentalities of commerce, such as railroad
2-1tracks, would be prohibited. Courts require more guidance to
distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional takings for
economic development25' and blight clearance, 25 2 which is what the Two-
Category Rule provides.
condemnation because it is much less costly and time-consuming than if they did it on
their own. See Scott, supra note 13, at 470. Because saving a private developer time and
money does not constitute a "public necessity of the extreme sort," the taking at the center
of Kelo does not constitute a public use, and therefore should be declared
unconstitutional.
248. See, e.g., Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
249. See generally title 45 of the United States Code, which is devoted exclusively to
the regulation of railroads.
250. See supra note 248.
251. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500
(Conn. 2004) (No. 04-108), available at 2004 WL 1659558. The petitioner stated that
"[s]even states, now including Connecticut, definitely allow condemnations for private
business development alone. Eight definitely forbid the use of eminent domain to transfer
property to private parties when the purpose is not the elimination of slums or blight.
Another three have indicated they probably will find such condemnations
unconstitutional." Id.
252. See, e.g., City of Las Vegas Downtown Dev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603 (2004); see supra note 116. The only difference between
the takings in Kelo and the taking in Pappas is that the city of Las Vegas had declared the
area surrounding the condemnee's property blight prior to initiating the condemnation,
which should make for an interesting discussion for the Supreme Court should it decide to
distinguish the two cases. See Pappas, 76 P.3d at 6. Because takings to remedy slum
clearance and blight did not begin until the late 1800s, see Pritchett, supra note 113, at 7,
these takings could not be considered traditional under the Federal Constitution's Public
Use Clause and therefore a strict scrutiny analysis of the legislative determination that the
taking falls within category (1) or category (2) would be proper should a similar case
emerge. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, Pappas would fail because the economic
conditions and the crime were not so problematic that the only solution to problems was
to develop a semi-indoor entertainment district owned by one developer. See Pappas, 76
P.3d at 6 (describing the blight designation as "increased crime rates and requests for
police assistance, business flight from the downtown area, decline in tourism, lack of
parking, visitor and residents' perception of lack of safety in the area, and increases in
vacant and aging buildings").
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court began its interpretation of the Public Use Clause
with an understanding that property rights are fundamental . But, in
Midkiff, the Court declared that legislative determinations of public use
trump individual property rights.254 The Michigan Supreme Court's
decision in Hathcock offers the Supreme Court some guidance on the
proper approach for discovering the original meaning of the Public Use
Clause.2 5 The Court should adopt this approach and find that deference
is inappropriate in reviewing most public-private takings, particularly
takings for economic development and blight clearance, and when the
taking has the following characteristics: there is no public necessity of an
extreme sort, the transferee will not be subject to government oversight,
and there is no change in the character of the property.25' The Court
should restore the original meaning of the Public Use Clause 57 and adopt
the test proposed by this Comment for reviewing public-public takings,"'
and the Two-Category Rule for reviewing public-private
condemnations. 9 The Court can begin adopting the rule by declaring
260
unconstitutional the taking involved in Kelo v. City of New London.
253. See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
See supra note 28, for the Court's statement.
254. Haw, Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984).
255. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765,781-84 (Mich. 2004).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 233-34.
257. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 181 (declaring that the Public Use Clause
"deserve[s] more respectful treatment than it receives today").
258. See supra text accompanying notes 226-31.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 233-404.
260. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004). See supra note 247, for
an application of the rule to the facts in Kelo.
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